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 Analysis Centre (INTCEN) more towards an 
independent operational agency into the 
European mechanism as well as the roles of 
the Intelligence College of Europe founded in 
France and the European Intelligence 
Academy established under the auspices of 
the Research Institute for European and 
American Studies (RIEAS) in Athens, 
Greece. Even though, effective intelligence 
cooperation is hard to achieve even at the 
national level as different services compete 
for resources and attention from the decision 
makers, past terrorist incidents in Europe 
served as a wake up for the public and private 
institutions to promote intelligence sharing 
and cooperation among European Union 
institutions and Member States.  
 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War more than 20 years created 
a world in which the relatively stable between the two 
superpowers has disappeared. During the Cold War, a 
country’s every action was conducted in the light of the 
adversary relationship between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. On 9/11 the international community was 
introduced to a new type of terrorism, one that was truly 
global in the organization and impact. In both the European 
Union, and the United States and Asia, it was immediately 
clear that an effective response would require new levels of 
intelligence cooperation in order to confront new threats 
such as biological warfare (covid 19), hybrid warfare, 
extremism, illegal migration, human and illicit trafficking, 
radical networks, transnational organized crime, money-












































The post-September 11, 2001, and following the 
terrorist acts in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Burgas 
(2021) in Bulgaria as well as more terrorist incidents (in 
France, Belgium, UK, Spain, Germany, Nordic states) that 
already happened until now in the European Union member 
states has challenged governments, policy-makers, religious 
leaders, the media and the general public to play both critical 
and constructive roles in the war against hybrid warfare and 
terrorism as well as radical Islamic extremism. (1) 
  
As the intelligence community works its way into the 
twenty-first century, it faces an unprecedented array of 
challenges. The chaotic world environment of the post-Cold 
War era (Islamic State in Syria and Iraq – ISIS – Arab Spring, 
Syria, Libya, and Ukraine crises, COVID 19, Iran nuclear 
issue, hybrid-biological warfare, and jihadi networks) offers 
a wide range of different issues to be understood, and a 
variety of new threats to be anticipated. The rapidly 
developing Information Age presents a process that needs 
to be a joint intelligence partnership which emphasizes the 
differences and grievances, and builds a future based upon 
the recognition that all face common threats, one that can 
effectively contained and eliminated only through a 
recognition of mutual interests and the use of multilateral 
alliances, strategies, and action. (2)  
 
It is in this context the article highlights the reasons 
for a European Union Intelligence Agency; points out the role 
of the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre 
(INTCEN) towards a prospective independent operational 
agency into the European Union Mechanism; points out the 
synergies between public and private institutions that 
specialize on intelligence studies by promoting intelligence 
collaboration such as the Intelligence College of Europe 
(France) and European Intelligence Academy (Greece), and 










































 sharing between the European Union (EU) and United 
States (USA). 
 
European Union Intelligence Agency: Is it necessary?  
The European Union as an entity has become an 
increasingly important factor in the European continent since 
the revival of the European Community through the Single 
European Act (SEA) signed in 1986. SEA is the official name 
for the 1992 program for the opening borders among the 27 
European member states. However, the instability in the 
North Africa (Arab Spring, and Middle East (Libya, Syria, 
Kurdish issue and Iraq crises, water conflicts) has affected 
the security and border control of the European Union 
member states by the huge flow of illegal immigration to the 
shores of Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and Spain. The European 
Union’s interior and justice ministers were clearly reluctant 
to hand over any major national intelligence functions to a 
European Commission at a time when ad hoc arrangements 
among the major national intelligence services in Europe – 
and with the United States – are recently in the forefront in 
the campaign against hybrid-biological warfare (Chinese 
virus, COVID 19), terrorism and Islamic extremism 
(particularly in France).  
 
The European Union member states interior and 
justice ministers did agree on closer collaboration on some 
security issues and appointed a counterterrorism 
coordinator who oversees monitoring the work of the 
European Union Council in the field of counterterrorism, 
better communication between European Union (EU) and 
United States (USA) and ensure that the European Union 
plays an active role in the fight against radical extremism. An 
important point of agreement was to “create a clearinghouse, 
where for the first-time investigating judges, police and 











































can direct information which becomes available in real time 
to all members”, stated a Commission spokesman.(3)  
 
Instead of the proposal of Belgium and Austria to 
create a European Union Intelligence Agency in order to fight 
international terrorism, the interior ministers from top five 
European states – Britain, Germany, France, Spain, and 
Italy – were unwilling to agree on how to share intelligence 
with all European Union member states and other nations. 
(4)  
 
From Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) to Intelligence 
Analysis Centre (INTCEN)  
European Union Intelligence Centre (INTCEN) joined 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, but it 
has a far longer history, its origins, as “a structure working 
exclusively on open-source intelligence (OSINT)”, lie in the 
Western European Union (WEU), an intergovernmental 
military alliance that officially disbanded in June 2011 after 
its function were gradually transferred over the last decade 
to the European Union’s Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP). (5) 
 
In 2012, INTCEN’s predecessor organization was 
established as a directorate of the General Secretarial of the 
European Council and given the name European Union (EU) 
Joint Situation Centre (SitCen). Staff from seven EU member 
states (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom) intelligence services were 
seconded to the center and started to exchange sensitive 
intelligence as part of an “insider club” made up of 
intelligence analysts from the seven member’s states. (6) 
 
In 2007, the European Union Joint Situation Centre’s 
(SitCen) ability to analyze situations outside the European 










































 Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), which pools civilian 
intelligence with that obtained by the European Union 
Military Staff’s intelligence Division. SIAC provides 
“intelligence input to crisis response planning and 
assessment for operational and exercises” (7). The 
European Union Military Staff was transferred to the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010 at the 
same time as European Union Joint Situation Centre 
(SitCen), although the institutions themselves have not been 
merged.  
 
In 2010, European Union Intelligence Analysis 
Centre (INTCEN) became par of the EEAS and expanded to 
cover internal and external threats, and to allow for 
collection, processing, analysis, and sharing of classified 
information. Referring to the former director of INTCEN, Ikka 
Salmi, points out: “EU INTCEN’s mission is to provide 
intelligence analyses, early warning and situational 
awareness to the High Representative and to the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), to various European Union 
decision making bodies in the fields of the Common Security 
and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and the Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP) and Counterterrorism, as well as to 
the European Union member states. EU INTCEN does this 
by monitoring and assessing international events 24 hours 
day, 7 days a week, focusing particularly on sensitive 
geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and other global threats.” (8) 
 
Today, INTCEN has its headquarters in Brussels 
(Belgium), and it employs European Union analysts and 
military background analysts. The analysts are seconded to 
INTCEN by their national intelligence services, as well as 
INTCEN employs European Union officials, temporary 
agents, and national experts from the security and 
intelligence community of the European Union member 











































European member’s satellites, such as France’s Helios and 
Pleiades, Germany’s SAR-Lupe, Italy’s Cosmo-Sky Med, 
and U.S. – owned commercial satellites. INTCEN receives 
diplomatic reports from the European Union 135 official 
delegation around the world, and classified intelligence from 
the European Union’s monitoring missions such as Georgia. 
However, INTCEN receives finished products from the 
European Union member states’ intelligence services rather 
than raw intelligence.  
 
Synergy of Public and Private intelligence institutions  
In the European Union member states, there has 
been a growing concern on the role of public and private 
partnerships in intelligence issues. In Greece, there is no 
synergy of the public authorities with private institutions 
(research think tanks and companies) even though Greece 
is surrounded by a plethora of threats. The lack of substantial 
reforms in the Greek security and intelligence community 
has left Greece vulnerable to potential threats in the future.  
 
However, the situation is similar to EU member states 
in the Balkan and Mediterranean states which the intensity 
of public and private partnership in intelligence affairs is 
below owing to poor understanding. The European 
Commission must take an initiative to promote an education 
program on the importance of public and private intelligence 
partnership in the European Union member states.  
The increasing development of research in 
intelligence studies has cultivated widespread awareness of 
the need to strengthen the collaboration between academia 
and the intelligence community. (9). 
 
On November 19, 2018, the European Union foreign 
and defense ministers approved the project of a joint 
intelligence training school (Joint European Union 










































 project is part of a list of 17 joint projects signed within the 
PESCO framework. (10) The purpose of the Joint European 
Union Intelligence School – which would be based in Cyprus 
– is to “provide education and training in intelligence 
disciplines and other specific fields to European Union 
member states intelligence personnel in cooperation with 
national agencies and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)”. (11) 
 
In Greece (2013), the Research Institute for 
European and American Studies (RIEAS) founded the 
European Intelligence Academy (EIA) – a specialized 
network of academia and former practitioners – in order to 
promote intelligence studies from an academic point of view; 
design and introduce intelligence courses for decision-
makers in the public and private sector; and establish a 
database of international intelligence literature. (12) 
 
In 2017, French President Macron in his speech on 
Europe at La Sorbonne University announced the idea of a 
“European Intelligence Academy” (EIA) as a key policy 
initiative since France did not step to cooperate with Greece 
and Cyprus in the PESCO project.  
 
The Intelligence College in Europe (ICE) was 
launched on 5th March 2019 in Paris, France. ICE brings 
together 23 member states, which signed a letter of intent on 
26th February 2020 in Zagreb, Croatia. ICE is a platform for 
reflection and outreach. Intelligence communities, 
academia, European decision-makers, citizens, and 
executives work together in order to raise awareness about 
intelligence-related challenges and issues via publications 
and the implementation of an academic program dedicated 
to intelligence professionals. (13) 
 
Intelligence is a national prerogative above all, and 











































way to counter-threats. As John M Nomikos, RIEAS director, 
points out, “trust is far more important than institutions for 
intelligence sharing” and Lelia Rousselet, RIEAS senior 
analyst, states “a joint intelligence school to share best 
training practices will definitely assist to create a more 
inclusive intelligence community at the European level and 
could be seen as a first step towards a more operational 
intelligence cooperation. A common intelligence culture 
would certainly be beneficial for European security.” (14) 
 
Today’s realities – political, social, medical (COVID 
19), international, economic – impose limitations upon 
governments never seen before in democratic societies. 
Therefore, academic curricula for intelligence studies should 
put special emphasis on how to develop policy “mindsets.”  
As Prof Anestis Symeonides, RIEAS academic 
advisor, points out, “intelligence studies fill the vital need for 
trained, capable individuals ready to take up the challenge 
of observing, understanding and explaining an increasingly 
chaotic and dangerous international environment. Building 
an “intelligence culture” is the ultimate goal. It is also 
important that governments, academic institutions, research 
institutes, dedicated international bodies and individual 
scholars continue to build collaborative ventures.” (15)  
 
In the end, understanding intelligence and security 
enable European citizens to make enlightened judgement in 
the field. The development of European networks (16) has 
paved the way for future transnational cooperation. At the 
end, the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre 
(INTCEN) personnel can substantially cooperate with the 
European College of Europe (ICE) and the European 
Intelligence Academy (EIA) on promoting public and private 













































 Concluding Remarks  
Intelligence cooperation is the most important 
weapon in the battle to contain the new threats (illegal 
migration, human trafficking, foreign jihadi networks, 
transnational crime, money-laundering, radical extremism, 
and hybrid-biological warfare) in the European Union 
member states, but its significance is ever greater than that. 
The first few years of the twenty-first century have witnessed 
a change in the role of secret intelligence in international 
politics. Intelligence and security issues are now more 
prominent than ever in Western political discourse as well as 
the wider public consciousness.  
 
The current environment in the European Union 
member states is less benign with multiple sources of 
insecurity. Societies across the southern and eastern shores 
of the Mediterranean (Syria, Iraq, Libya,) energy security 
issues in Eastern Mediterranean Sea and central Europe 
(Ukraine) are experiencing rapid geopolitical and 
geoeconomics changes. For the foreseeable future, security 
agenda in the southeastern part of NATO (especially Turkey) 
will be driven to a considerable extent by internal security 
concerns.  
 
In this context, the synergy of public and private 
intelligence institutions must be introduced in the European 
Union member states, the European Union Intelligence 
Analysis Centre (INTCEN) needs to be strengthened to be 
able to have an  independent operational role inside the EU 
mechanism and actively collaborate with the Intelligence 
College of Europe (ICE) and the European Intelligence 
Academy (EIA) as well as research think tanks that focus its 
research agenda on promoting intelligence cooperation 













































Finally, intelligence profession is at a watershed in its 
intellectual history. For nearly a hundred years, the focus of 
intelligence operations had remained unchanged. (17) The 
categories of information required for national states and the 
analysis of civilian and military capabilities and intentions 
were largely the same in 1909 and 2021. In the twenty-first 
century, intelligence work promises to be fundamentally 
different. If so, an evolutionary approach towards the training 
of intelligence personnel and the development, as well as 
institutions of collection methods and systems (including 
technological advances, artificial intelligence – AI) – even 
toward the process of analysis itself- will no longer suffice to 
assure timely and accurate intelligence about the threats in 
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